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The Habermas-Ratzinger Debate and the Use of the Humanities in
Constitutional Interpretation1
Ferenc Hörcher
Two concepts of the constitution
On the general level, this paper is interested in the relationship of individual
and communal values, as it is – as well as it should be–- defined in consti-
tutional documents. What it tries to show is that although originally consti-
tutions serve as the foundations of the legal system of a given political com-
munity, as a result of the rather strong focus on individual citizens’ funda-
mental rights against the state since the middle of the last century, the com-
munal political aspect of these documents is nowadays pushed into the
background. In order to prove this claim and make sense of this development,
and also in order to suggest a way to remedy the problem, this paper will
deal with the new Hungarian Fundamental Law, which entered into force on
1 January 2012 (Csink et al. (eds.) 2012; Tóth 2012)2, focusing on its pream-
ble in particular.3 It will show that the seemingly anachronistic and pathetic
paragraphs serve the function of identifying the common cultural heritage
of the nation, thus providing the basis for a common communal identity,
which was missing or remained hidden in the earlier constitution. In this way
it will be interpreted as a return to the earlier function of a constitution.
The question posed in the first part is almost like a chicken-and-egg prob-
lem. Is there a genuine need for certain requisites of a community before a
constitution can be drawn, the function of which is to create that community?
1.
1 This publication was supported by the TÁMOP 4.2.1. B-11/2/KMR-2011-0002 grant
of the European Union and the Hungarian Government.
2 That the first assessments of the merits and faults of the new Hungarian constitution
belong to two, competing sets of interpretations by Hungarian intellectuals is itself
perhaps a symptom of the deep cultural-political division line in the country’s intel-
lectual life.
3 For an earlier interpretation of the Preamble of the Fundamental Law of Hungary by
this author, see Hörcher (2012).
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In this part of the paper, some of the basic insights of the Habermas-
Ratzinger dialogue (Habermas/Ratzinger 2005) will be cited, where both
protagonists tend to answer the question in the same way: indeed, there is a
need for a pre-political moral basis if we want a truly effective constitution.
Habermas himself refers back in this respect to Böckenförde’s memorable
formulation (Böckenförde 1991) of this chicken-and-egg problem of con-
stitution drawing. This will be seen as a competing understanding of the role
of the constitution in comparison to the most popular recent trend of regard-
ing it as the first and final defence line of individual rights against state
intervention.
Following this reconstruction, the paper will interpret some points of the
preamble of the new Hungarian constitution in order to show that it makes
very good sense if we look at it bearing the conclusions of the Habermas-
Ratzinger dialogue in mind. From this perspective, it is an effort to introduce
the theme of the need for this pre-political communality in the debate about
the new constitution. The Preamble seems to work in a tricky way: it intro-
duces the idea that certain communal values are still relevant in and for the
Hungarian political community, in order to create them, and in this way to
secure them constitutionally as soon as they are born. It is argued that the
Hungarian Fundamental law is to recreate and defend these communal val-
ues by reaching out into the historical past, and that instead of the harsh
criticism of a pure and formalistic legal approach, a more sympathetic cul-
tural-historical interpretation is required in order to make sense of these ef-
forts. Through these steps the paper arrives at the reconsideration of Böck-
enförde’s second and more tentative thesis that a Constitution keeps many
of the remnants of a religious covenant.4
The chicken-and-egg problem of constitution drawing
The historically conditioned convictions both in the Hungarian and Euro-
pean public awareness, as well as the deep divides within these realms lead
us to the first and most basic problem of constitution drawing in modern and
post-modern secularised Western societies. I would call this the chicken-
and-egg problem of constitution drawing. It consists of two theses, each of
2.
4 If we analyse the title of the preamble of the Hungarian Fundamental Law, called
National Avowal, we see the reference to these political theological origins.
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which presupposes the other. The first problem (the chicken) is that consti-
tutional founding fathers draw a constitution to legitimize the political
regime. The second one (the egg) is this: the first pre-requisite to draw a new
constitution is a pre-political, pre-constitutional source of legitimacy and a
(cultural moral) order in your community. In other words, in order to have
a legitimate regime, and in this way to define your political community, the
regime needs to be constitutionally guaranteed; but to give constitutional
guarantees to your regime, you need an already existing political commu-
nity.
This inbuilt contradiction of all constitutional processes is formulated by
the German constitutional lawyer, Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde. His thesis
is the following:
The liberal, secularised state is nourished by presuppositions that it cannot itself
guarantee. On the one hand, it can only survive as a liberal state if the liberty it
allows its citizens regulates itself from within on the basis of the moral substance
of the individual and the homogeneity of society. On the other hand, it cannot
attempt to guarantee those inner regulatory forces by its own efforts… without
abandoning its liberalness… (Böckenförde 1991: 45)
What this amounts to is in fact a proposal to look at constitutions in a wider
context, and especially from a political, rather than simply from a human
rights perspective. For human rights, by their nature, are hardly negotiable.
But Böckenförde’s thesis shows us that the liberty that constitutions can
guarantee does not, or should not, concern only each and every citizen, but
the whole political community together from which it derives its own legit-
imacy.5 This communal liberty, which is after all the source of the guarantee
of individual liberties, is by its very nature, self-controlled and therefore
necessarily limits the freedom of the particular citizen in certain cases.
If we want to appreciate the importance of Böckenförde’s insight for un-
derstanding the European and the Hungarian case, we need to take two fur-
ther steps. First, we have to look at the development of an exaggerated focus
on universal individual rights in recent constitutional developments, and
then we have to see that in the Habermas-Ratzinger debate two German
thinkers with opposite world-views seem to come close to each other in
admitting the truth of Böckenförde’s thesis. This surprising concordance
suggests, as we shall see, the relevance of the thesis in actual new constitu-
tion-drawing processes like in the Hungarian case, and in constitutional the-
5 For a similar account based on different assumptions, see Skinner (1998).
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ory as well. It can help correct one of the supposed self-evident theses about
modern constitutions: that they are simply meant to defend the individual’s
rights against the misuses of the overwhelming powers of the modern/post-
modern state.
Habermas’s modus vivendi between enlightened reason and religious
belief
In this part of the paper, we look at the Habermas-Ratzinger dialogue on the
pre-political moral conditions of the constitution of a free state. It will be
shown that there is something more to it than the individual’s defence against
the state. Let us try to reconstruct the main points of these discussions one
by one.
In the published version of the dialogue, we only have two neatly argued
essays by the two conversationalists, and cannot see the dynamics of the
exchange. It is Habermas who starts the book format with a paper entitled
Vorpolitische Grundlagen des demokratischen Rechtsstaates?6
For the lack of space, we do not reconstruct the whole line of the argument,
focusing only on three of its aspects. First, we have to show his standard
interpretation of political liberalism. Then we have to see that he steps over
this liberal minimum towards what he calls “constitutional patriotism.” Fi-
nally, he has to make sense of the fact that religion does not seem to disappear
in (post)modern Western societies; therefore, there is a need for a modus
vivendi between enlightened reason and religious belief as well.
Habermas certainly accepts and affirms the liberal minimum as his start-
ing point, a kind of updated Kantian republicanism. Accordingly, political
liberalism is more than the individual’s safeguards against the state (Haber-
mas/Ratzinger 2005: 22). It guarantees a justification of constitutional
democracy, which is independent of the religious and metaphysical tradi-
tions of the particular country. The “Rechtsstaat”7, when established in a
democratic manner, provides more for its citizen than simple negative lib-
erty. By what Habermas calls “communicative freedom” it is also able to
stimulate its citizens for more political activity (Habermas/Ratzinger 2005:
23).
3.
6 Circa: The prepolitical basis of the democratic constitutional state.
7 Roughly the German equivalent of the English ’rule of law’ ideal (mutatis mutandis).
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But as soon as it does more than simply safeguard individual negative
liberties, it raises the question of social cohesion, which is characteristically
missing from most mainstream accounts of the liberal minimum. This is all
the more surprising because the Hobbesian-Lockean concept of the modern
state was created as an answer to the chaotic civil war conditions of the
period, caused by religious disputes, and the deep schisms of society brought
about by theological disputes. The Leviathan is a mechanical monster whose
primary aim is to hold individuals together under the umbrella of the state.
From another perspective, the problem of legitimacy also very soon sur-
faced, as this was perhaps the most important argument against absolute
rulers. In addition, no legitimacy can be expected without the constitutional
arrangement covering the problem of social cohesion as well. Naturally, one
can argue that democratic procedures themselves can only solve that prob-
lem because they help citizens identify themselves with the neutral state
“system”, but Habermas is not too optimistic in this regard. He claims that
a stronger, unifying bond is required, which needs to be built on such as-
sumptions as the common good (Gemeinwohl) and the common interest
(allgemeine Interessen) (Habermas/Ratzinger 2005: 22, 23).
When we arrive at this point, we cannot stop short of what Habermas calls
“constitutional patriotism” (Verfassungspatriotismus) (Habermas/Ratzinger
2005: 25). Behind the façade of a constitutional document, we need to find
the following, or other such pillars as a common religious background, a
common language, or a national consciousness. A constitution is supposed
to create the conditions of governability, which cannot be achieved without
a minimum level of solidarity and self-sacrifice among the members of the
political community. Solidarity cannot be achieved, however, without the
basics of social justice. And social justice dwells in the particularities of the
historical context, and if you are interested in that, you need to enter the rich
and thick texture of cultural value-orientations (dichteres Geflecht kul-
tureller Wertorientierungen) (Habermas/Ratzinger 2005: 25). The citizens
themselves understand and interpret their own constitution not through its
abstract, normative content, but always identifying themselves with its con-
crete background meaning, as they draw it from the context of their own
national and familial history.
It is at this point that Habermas’s talk becomes self-critical of his own
tradition. Although he himself seemed to be a partisan advocate of enlight-
ened rationality, now he seems to be quite sceptical about the constitutional
consequences of modernism. He talks about the option of a derailed mod-
ernisation (entgleisende Modernisierung), which could easily consume the
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accumulated sources of cohesion and solidarity in society, and this would
be the more dangerous as with simple legal enforcement this stock of demo-
cratic bonds cannot be rebuilt. The centrifugal power results in the sort of
depoliticization so often echoed in the polemic texts of the critics of main-
stream liberalism usually labelled as communitarian and republican.8 Here
Habermas returns to this internal criticism of liberalism, based on the com-
mon sense voters’ loss of trust and disenchantment about its “invisible hand”,
a mistrust that is tuned even louder by the radical scepticism about the effi-
cacy of reason in human matters generally. It is in fact Habermas’s worries,
which are partly motivated by the postmodern critique of universal truth and
abstract justice, and partly by the actual practice of a spread of anti-demo-
cratic and fundamentalist ideologies, that seem to bring him close to the
universalism of Christianity, and more particularly, to Catholicism. He
claims that enlightened philosophical Vernunft needs to correct itself by a
reconsideration of the hidden potential of religious belief and that of the
theological doctrines on which this mental framework is built. In other
words, he encourages philosophers not to shy away from learning once again
from theology – while he still keeps his secular presumptions and reserves
his own trust in Reason true and valid.
Let us see whether Habermas is right in his final assessment of the situ-
ation. It is only now that the meaning of the dialogue form becomes clearer,
when we realize that Cardinal Ratzinger tries to answer the very worries
Habermas voices. Again, we shall be unable to reconstruct the whole of his
contribution,9 but concentrate on the issues Habermas brought to the fore-
front and Ratzinger answers, and in particular, on Ratzinger’s ideas on lib-
erty and law, on the relationship of religion and reason, and finally on his
views about the process of secularisation.
8 I am of course referring here to the writings of MacIntyre, Sandel, Taylor and Walzer
on the one hand, and Skinner and Pettit, on the other. These two groups are neither
homogeneous in themselves, nor close to each other, representing rather divergent
political orientations they provide a loud voice of public criticism of what they regard
as individualistic liberalism.
9 Entitled: Was die Welt zusammenhält. Vorpolitische moralische Grundlagen eines
freiheitlichen Staates. (What holds the world together? The pre-political moral basis
for a free state.).
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Ratzinger’s liberty, reason and religious hope
It is not surprising that for Ratzinger as well as for Habermas, the liberal
minimum is the starting point. However, his idea of liberty is from the very
start richer than the minimum content of the negative liberty of political
liberalism. He relies on an analysis of the concept of the Rechtsstaat, which
is parallel but not equivalent to the Common law concept of the rule of law
in German language jurisprudence, when he claims that liberty without law
(rechtlose Freiheit) is self-destructive: it evidently leads to anarchy, and
through that to the disorder which destroys the safeguards of individual lib-
erty as well (Habermas/Ratzinger 2005: 42).10
However, while law supports liberty, law itself is also in need of further
support. What could provide the fundament of law in a Rechtsstaat? Natu-
rally, as in the natural law tradition, it is morality that lends the edifice of
law its firmness. A procedural concept of justice, the majority principle can-
not arrange it alone (Habermas/Ratzinger 2005: 43). And is morality itself
sound enough? After all, we have seen Habermas’s doubts about the plu-
ralistic challenge to morality, and the sceptical concerns about its relevance
in a highly complex, individualised society. Certainly, Ratzinger is not so
naïve as to suppose that morality is untouched by the spirit of the time. He
himself is most concerned about two of the contemporary challenges to our
moral firmament. One is terrorism. Once again, let us keep in mind that the
talk takes place in the aftermath of September 11 when even progressive
intellectuals had to seriously rethink their own strong convictions, in order
to find a common ground with their more traditionalist countrymen against
the common enemy, and they had to admit that the Greco-Roman Christian
morality is robustly universalistic, and therefore its main norms, including
the ten commandments are acceptable not only for the moderate versions of
other major historical religions, but for atheists as well. The pure fact that
the terrorists did have support for their seemingly unacceptable actions even
in Western societies shows that there is a strong moral nihilism which targets
our most basic moral precepts. On the other hand, and this is the second
challenge, scientific inventions and discoveries directly confront us with the
question how to reaffirm our moral insights in light of the often disturbing
4.
10 We do not have the space to describe the difference between the concept of the rule
of law and the German-language concept of the Rechtsstaat. However, one should
keep in mind that the latter is already very closely related to the concept of the state,
while the former one’s validity does not depend on an idea of the state.
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results of science not yet available to our forefathers. Ratzinger’s primary
example is cloning, but the whole spectrum of brain research or artificial
intelligence triggers similar ethical worries. The results themselves would
require more research into unchartered territories, but our moral convictions
make any further steps highly risky, or morally unacceptable.
Before we can reliably assess the dangers and losses caused by the moral
framework of Western modernity (a term not characteristic of Ratzinger’s
own vocabulary), we have to rethink – as Habermas suggested – the rela-
tionship of reason and religion.11 In theology too rational discourse had its
high water marks, but in the light of 20th century tragedies, serious questions
need to be answered within theology itself.12 Subjectivism, relativism, par-
ticularism, and the postmodernism – all had their share in discouraging a
self-confident rational discourse of theology. Yet, the tradition of the ratio-
nality of scholasticism and the relevance of the natural law doctrine always
resurface in theoretical discussions. In the 20th century the dilemma once
again came up whether this rationalistic theology could itself underpin a
universal morality, based on natural law and the human rights. Ratzinger
seems to be rather cautious as far as these hopes are concerned. He is more
open to a frame of mind which investigates the problem of what religion and
reason should mean for each other, and the necessity to mutually accept
barriers and duties (eine Lehre von den Menschenpflichten und von den
Grenzen des Menschen) (Habermas/Ratzinger 2005: 51) beside and beyond
the legally sanctioned declarations of universal rights and liberties. They
surely have their own functions in the life of a thriving Western political
community, but religion and reason should not pretend not to know about
each other.
After considering the close relationship between liberty and law, reason
and religion, Ratzinger arrives at the third point he wants to make. This is a
reassessment of the problem of secularisation in our present day discourse.
Recent researches into comparative cultural studies, as well as the resurfac-
ing of a discourse of political theology in our Western debates suggest that
perhaps the idea that the West can follow a special path, a Sonderweg, is
itself the manifestation of a Western bias resulting from an overestimation
11 About this theme, see the papal encyclical Fides et Ratio (John Paul II, Pope 1998).
12 See the rational self-criticism of reason and the faithful criticism of faith in the po-
litical theology of Johann Baptist Metz (Downey 1999).
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of the powers of a central reason in organising our complex societies.13 It is
certainly not surprising that Ratzinger joins the camp of those contempo-
raries who argue that the historical thesis of a straight progress (or decline)
to final disbelief is not a correct description of the modern, and even less of
the postmodern condition. To be sure, Ratzinger does not turn into the anti-
modernist type of thinker (Habermas/Ratzinger 2005: 53, 55). Rather, he
joins the renewed interest in political theology, which is not framed simply
in the philosophical paradigm of anti-modernist thinkers, but also in that of
the post-Vatican II tradition of theology. The main difference between the
theological and the anti-modernist philosophical trends is an optimism or
hope, which is present in theological writings as a consequence of their
courageous reliance on the teachings of the Bible and of the tradition of the
Church. Nevertheless, my point is only to refer to the common element in
the thought of Habermas and Ratzinger, the one that enabled them to sit
together: that there is perhaps a need for a community’s pre-political bond
for a constitution to work properly.
Thick and thin concepts of a constitution
If the thesis that there is an overlap, or at least a meeting point between their
respective discourses is correct, it makes the strong claim of a shift from
simply individual human values to communal values in some contemporary
constitutional thought as well more viable. In what follows, we rely on this
strong claim, and from this perspective have a look at the value choices of
the Preamble of the new Hungarian Fundamental Law. More particularly
what needs to be explained is why a new constitutional catalogue of the basic
communal values of this political community was required. First, the sym-
bolic and historical-cultural values will be analysed, which will be followed
by a look at the concept of individual and social responsibility, and finally
the social role of religious and moral norms will be taken into account.
In an earlier paper, I argued that the main reason behind the lack of a
coherent system of values in the Hungarian constitution created at the na-
tional roundtable talks of the transition period (1989-1990) was an effort to
achieve a minimum consensus among partners around the table with very
5.
13 About the problems confronting a centralised reason in governing complex societies,
see Hayek (1969).
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different experiences, aspirations and final Weltanschauungen (Hörcher
2009). The main dividing line around the table, of course, was the one that
separated the Communists representing the party and its regime and their
allies and the as yet unelected opposition. But within the camp of the Com-
munists itself there were remarkable differences of opinion, and due to the
abrupt changes in the political situation these differences shifted rather
significantly during the process of the negotiations. Certainly much more
and much wider differences were to be expected among the different strands
of the opposition. This distance and distrust among the parties to the nego-
tiation made it only reasonable not to strive for some sort of a well-defined
and detailed construction of political, social and moral priorities in the con-
stitution, which only served to frame the road to the first election, giving the
country a freely elected, legitimate parliament and government, and – against
the wish of some of the opposition – to lay down the foundations of a legit-
imate political institutional structure. The difficulties to find a compromise
satisfying all the participants excluded ideological negotiations and, there-
fore, the cautious and fragile agreement emphasized that the only reasonable
aim to target was a transitory constitution that would serve only until a final
constitution could be worked out by political parties legitimized to take part
in a constitutional assembly by free elections.
However, the political reality rearranged this initial schedule. The polit-
ical power of the first government was so weak that no energies remained
to face the challenge of the creation of a final constitution which could unite
a society dramatically shattered into pieces after decades of Communist
rule.
On the other hand, the constitutional practice of the young democracy was
largely predetermined by the ideas and actual policies of the newly estab-
lished constitutional court, led by its first extremely motivated professor
president, László Sólyom. The often rather activist interpretation of the tran-
sitory constitution by the judges of the constitutional court has not succeeded
in providing historical justice to a community which had been suppressed
by totalitarian regimes whose main leaders and culprits very rarely had to
face criminal or even political charges before criminal courts, which could
have legitimized the new system in the eyes of the general voters. Although
in the short run the majority of citizens were more interested in finding their
place in the new economic context rather than in the symbolic politics of
historical retribution, in the long run the system’s value deficit played a
major role in delegitimizing the political system. The explicit preference of
the Sólyom court for legal security as opposed to historical justice created a
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political climate in which reference to commonly shared value contents in
the general political discussions in order to heal historical wounds and re-
store public trust was not a realistic option of political strategies.14
If we apply the insights gained from the dialogue between Habermas and
Ratzinger, there can be no doubt that sooner or later this discrepancy between
the needs of the political transition itself and the risk avoiding policies of
two of the most important actors of the new constitutional context, most
notably of the first prime minister himself and the first president of the Con-
stitutional Court, had to wreak havoc. As we have seen, a constitution needs
to reconnect the neutral institutional framework with the underlying moral-
cultural order without which it loses its legitimacy and the motivation of the
citizenry to actively support it. In the long run, therefore, it was evident, that
a new constitution would eventually be needed to solve the problem, and to
let the values of society infiltrate the institutions created by the impersonal
mechanism of the law and by the all too cautious lawgiver. Any political
analyst who wants to present the decision to draw a new constitution as
simply the tyranny of the Orbán government disregards this necessity – even
if it is a legitimate criticism that the two-thirds parliamentary majority behind
the government did not manage to convince its fragmented and humiliated
opposition to take part in the constitution drawing process. Therefore the
aim of the constitution is unlikely to be achieved in the short run.
History in the constitution and the historical constitution
In what follows, we cannot deal with the whole system of the new consti-
tution. Rather we shall focus on the part of it where the new perspective is
introduced into the constitutional edifice: i.e. on the preamble, which bears
the very telling title of ‘National Avowal’. We claim that it is through the
preamble that the text of the constitution tries to connect the neutral state
institutions with society’s cultural-moral order, in this way making it pos-
sible for trust to accumulate towards it. As mentioned, we have already given
an overall assessment of the preamble (Hörcher 2012). We shall only focus
6.
14 For a wording of this basic choice by the constitutional court, see the following
extract from a court decision: “A mindig részleges és szubjektív igazságosságnál a
tárgyi és formális elvekre támaszkodó jogbiztonság előbbrevaló.” (As opposed to
the always partial and subjective justice, priority should be given to legal security
supported by objective and formal principles.) (11/1992).
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on those of its elements that provide evidence that it had and still has this
legitimating function. We shall take out those building blocks that should be
seen as newly introduced symbolic-communal values and cultural-historical
references.
One of the remarkable features of the National Avowal is a vocabulary in
which not only are different references to culture and history repeatedly used,
but which provides an approximation of these terms within the context of
the Hungarian constitutional tradition. The nation’s history is proudly pro-
jected on a canvas of one thousand years, tracing it back to the kingdom of
St. Stephen, the founder of the State.15 The possible criticism of xenophobia
can firstly be countered by referring to the parts where the national minori-
ties’ language and culture are defended, and secondly by pointing out that
national culture is here understood as a “contribution to the diversity of the
European Union.” Further, the wide historical perspective of the constitution
makes it quite natural that the long forgotten tradition of what is called
historical constitution is also reintroduced here. The move of reawakening
this historical phrase is highly debated by critics who allege that this part of
the text is anachronistic and suspect a political ulterior motive, which en-
courages the lawgiver to destroy the current practice of the constitutional
court (Radnóti 2012). However, one should seriously consider the following
question: was it really necessary that a country like Hungary, with a long-
standing constitutional tradition, when regaining its independence in 1990
should try to imitate the quite recent constitutional practice of a foreign
country – in our case that of Germany? Why was no thought given in the
context of the political transition process to opting to update its own earlier
practice – or at least trying to reconcile it with contemporary international
standards. I do not find it quite so unquestionable that a country’s own con-
stitutional past should be declared dead because of a break in its history. No
doubt, the tradition needs to be re-formed before it can be used in actual
constitutional legal practice: but if it can play a part in reassuring a nation
of its own historical identity, it is worth the price. Therefore, I do not regard
it quite so mischievous that the preamble, no doubt at certain points articu-
lating a slightly exaggerated, and occasionally even kitschy pathos, feels
entitled to solemnly declare that “We do not recognise the suspension of our
historical constitution due to foreign occupations.”
15 “We are proud that our king Saint Stephen built the Hungarian State on solid ground
and made our country a part of Christian Europe one thousand years ago.” References
to the text of the preamble: (The Fundamental Law of Hungary 2011).
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In the same way: Is it truly a form of aggressive nationalism, and therefore
an unacceptable discrimination, to claim that the National Avowal is pro-
nounced by the Nation?16 If it is a historical fact that (1) there was a consti-
tutional tradition which referred to the Hungarian nation and that (2) this
nation was endangered in the historical storms of the last century, is it not
natural that the document that serves the political revival of the constitutional
tradition expresses its wish to get the members of the nation united, provided
this aim does not turn the nation against its neighbours? If strong words are
pronounced against this intention, they tell more about the non-negotiable
position in the liberal credo of a few contemporary critics who regard ‘the
nation’ as a shameful word and less about an acclaimed ”nationalistic” ide-
ology, which – no doubt sometimes with exaggerated pathos – tries to help
to return the country’s self-perception to a state of normality.
If the nation is an unwelcome concept for present day students of consti-
tutional law in the text of a constitution, the defence of marriage is even more
unacceptable to many who regard it as discriminating against other intimate
relationships. Yet there is nothing unacceptable in the syllogism that if the
nation is a constitutional value to be defended, and the nation’s survival
depends on the traditional institutions of marriage and family, the constitu-
tion has a role to safeguard these institutions, even if recent radical political
trends in the European context indicate that this is outmoded.17
Turning to the references to religion and traditional moral values, it might
seem that we try to collect only themes that challenge the contemporary
consensus. Although using the name of (the Christian) God is tricky – a
quotation from the first line of the official Hungarian Hymn is used as a
motto for the whole –, representatives of the secularist ideologies from a
wide spectrum of the European political and intellectual elite find it unac-
ceptable that this reference is still there. However, if we take the main theme
of the Habermas-Ratzinger debate seriously, we should find nothing sur-
prising in the Fundamental Law’s claim that one of the most important safe-
guards of nationhood is exactly religion: “We recognise the role of Chris-
tianity in preserving nationhood.” Here we have a clear case that proves that
16 “We, the Members of the Hungarian Nation…” According to Sándor Radnóti, the
Fundamental Law “resembles an agitating, homogenizing, activist pledge that ex-
cludes those who think differently” (Radnóti 2012: 109).
17 “Hungary shall protect the institution of marriage… shall also protect the insitution
of the family, which it recognizes as the basis for survival of the nation.” (Fourth
Amendment: Article 1.).
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present day constitutional sensibilities are to be reconsidered in the light of
the debate that convincingly argues that a system of legal regulations cannot
work long without the underlying moral-cultural horizon.
Secularists would also sharply criticize the preamble’s phrase that “we
honour the holy Crown” (Radnóti 2013). This intolerance towards an alter-
native view is the more incomprehensible because at another point the text
explicitly claims, “The State and Churches shall be separate. Churches shall
be autonomous. The State shall cooperate with the Churches for community
goals.” Giving reverence to the Holy Crown is not plain Christian tradition-
alism, but simply reconnects the present to an earlier constitutional doctrine,
where the Holy Crown served as a constitutional guarantee. Historians cer-
tainly keep debating the ancient status of the doctrine of the Holy Crown
(Péter 2003; Rady 2000), yet it is unquestionable that in one form or another
the Holy Crown belongs to the political nation’s past, therefore its return in
the present document should not surprise anyone – though it certainly needs
serious reflections how and in what sense constitutional significance should
be attributed to it.
That the new Hungarian Fundamental Law, with its explicit references to
values in its preamble belongs to the post 9/11 reawakening of Western po-
litical morality and theology, as it emerges in the Habermas-Ratzinger dia-
logue is further reassured by its constant recall of morality. It cherishes “tal-
ent, persistence and moral strength” and rather outspokenly defends the self-
evident idea that “after the decades of the twentieth century which led to a
state of moral decay, we have an abiding need for spiritual and intellectual
renewal.”
If we want to historically evaluate this confrontation between the anti-
religious secular ideology of contemporary constitutional theory and the of-
ten pathetic, sometimes exaggeratedly moralising and sometimes even sen-
timentally religious overtones of the language of the preamble, we realize
that the founding fathers of the new Hungarian Fundamental Law deliber-
ately followed the language use of the elderly Edmund Burke in fierce debate
with defenders of the French Revolution. We even find an almost direct
reference to Burke when the National Avowal calls attention to something
like intergenerational solidarity in a phrase which defines the constitutional
document as “a covenant among Hungarians past, present and future; a living
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framework which expresses the nation’s will and the form in which we want
to live.”18
This connection between the dead, the living and the not-yet-born points
to the idea of intergenerational responsibility. The concept of responsibility,
explicitly used in the text in the sense of self-reliance, does not simply refer
to a kind of personal trustworthiness or reliability in this context. Neither
should it be understood as simply referring to political responsibility. In the
words of the National Avowal, it is rather “a sense of responsibility for every
Hungarian”, including “our descendants.” Here the Fundamental Law relies
on Burke’s original idea, who in turn borrows it from ancient wisdom (mos
maiorum) in the ancient Roman tradition and extrapolates it to future gen-
erations. Here, the tradition-dependent view of the Fundamental Law proves
to be quite topical, confronting issues that are only too relevant for the con-
temporary world and its aftermath. The idea of the covenant again refers to
the religious background: this norm (or promise), which is naturally of Bib-
lical origin, referred to the alliance between God and the chosen people, a
religious and political community itself. The idea is present in the Old Tes-
tament and the New Testament alike, thus it belongs to both the Jewish and
the Christian heritage. In a way, the invocation in the motto very nicely fits
this concept of a nation’s covenant, as indeed the poet of the Hymn referred
back to the historical tradition of seeing the Hungarian nation in the role of
the chosen people, in its ambivalent love-hate relationship to God.
Böckenförde’s second thesis
We have seen that one of the most important guidelines of the new Hungarian
Fundamental Law is an effort to overcome the supposed individualism of
the earlier one, and an effort to talk about the individual in her capacity of
being part of a larger whole, together with her relations to others. This might
be the reason behind its renewed interest in the smaller circles of human
communities (marriage and family), and in the larger ones (nation, religion).
This is why it does not present the state as the common enemy: it tries to
show that in fact the state might be helpful to the individual as well as to her
7.
18 Burke famously talks about “a partnership not only between those who are living,
but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born”
(Clark 2001: 261).
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smaller or larger communities. The constitution turns out to be quite helpful
in safeguarding individual as well as of communal interests.
There is one more question to be answered. To finish the comparison of
a theoretical dialogue between a secularly oriented philosopher and an aca-
demic theologian and the connection between them and the actual birth of a
new constitutional value-system in Hungary, I will turn back to the original
source of Habermas’s ideas to answer it, or at least to make sense of it – and
this is the constitutional perspective of Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde. This
author, a former judge at the constitutional court of Germany himself, and
one of the most authoritative voices in the constitutional development of the
German Federal Republic, presented an almost blasphemous proposition,
i.e. to reconsider the isolation between religion and the “neutral” state.19
What I shall call Böckenförde’s second, tentative thesis is the following:
So we must ask once again – with Hegel – whether the secularised, temporal
state must not also, in the final analysis, live by the inner impulses and bonding
forces imparted by the religious faith of its citizens – not, of course, in such a
way that it is turned back into a ’Christian’ state, but in such a way that Christians
no longer see that state, in its secularity, as something alien and hostile to their
faith but as an opportunity for liberty, to preserve and realise which is their
responsibility, too. (Böckenförde 1991: 46)
The implicit question behind Böckenförde’s hesitant idea is the following:
Is it not the case that perhaps even the much acclaimed liberal neutrality
needs the support of religious faith, which it deliberately excludes from its
own considerations? (Böckenförde 1991: 46) As the point is made to termi-
nate his essay on the rise of the state without explicit answer, one needs to
be cautious interpreting this second thesis. However, it is clear from the
whole argument of the article that he focuses his analysis of the challenges
of the contemporary Western state on two specific dangers. One is what is
called the “Christian” state, where the separation of State and Church has
not actually taken place. The other is an exaggerated understanding of sec-
ularisation, where it also means something like “de-Christianisation” (Böck-
enförde 1991: 43). In his view, the Western constitutional state is between
these two radical positions. The separation between the temporal and the
19 The concept of neutrality needs to be put into brackets, as obviously the concept of
a neutral state is itself an idealisation, and it very clearly bears the marks of a liberal
(i.e. ideological) message.
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spiritual should be taken seriously.20 But this should not by definition mean
a criticism of religion. On the contrary, the suggestion is if we deepen our
historical knowledge of the history of the birth of the European state, we
shall obviously recognise that the separation thesis is a natural development
from Christian premises, as liberty is a virtue cherished by Christianity itself.
However, in order to keep order within its own border, the state needs to
look after the safeguards of liberty. If nations cannot live “without a unifying
bond antecedent to that of liberty”, neither can states do so, as after all, their
raison d’etre is that of the nation. Neither state, nor nation can long survive,
suggests Böckenförde, if it needs to “live by the guaranteed provision of
individual liberty alone” (Böckenförde 1991: 44). Böckenförde is quite
sceptical of the kind of simple recourse to ‘values’, that we encounter in the
Hungarian political debates, or of the Aristotelian polis tradition, that con-
temporary scholarly literature advocated in Germany.21 However, he is also
quite clear that the question has to be asked: “On what will the state base
itself in time of crisis?” Here, we would not go any further than Böckenförde
did, and offer the question without comments for the reader’s consideration,
and if needed, the further secondary literature below, for the discriminate
and responsible reader.
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